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Self and Society in the Iliad 
 
Douglas Cairns 
 
In some of the most influential accounts of Homeric society and ethics, Homeric values 
are seen as reflecting a fragmented society, dominated by powerful individuals barely 
restrained by collective loyalties, whose chief obligations are to themselves, then to their 
families, and then only to a limited extent to others. This is a society in which powerful 
individuals have a claim to do as they please as long as they remain successful, for only 
success matters. Above all, it is a competitive society, in which the relative unimportance 
of co-operation is reflected in the words used to express judgements of people and 
actions: good men (agathoi) are those who are excel in prowess, wealth, and rank, while 
bad men (kakoi) lack these qualities. The most powerful value terms used to condemn 
men’s actions censure failure, not injustice. 
A society rather like this does exist in Homer: its members are fierce and lawless, 
and they neither plant nor plough, for their crops grow spontaneously. They have no 
assemblies and no laws; the head of household gives laws to his own family and ‘nobody 
has the slightest interest in what his neighbours decide’. They are contemptuous of Zeus 
and his laws of hospitality, and indeed of all the gods. They do not even put water in their 
wine, but eat human flesh washed down with ‘unmixed milk’. These are the Cyclopes of 
Odyssey 9.  
Cyclopean society defines civilized society by antithesis; and so the Odyssey’s 
idea of civilization requires the political institutions of the community, agriculture, 
involvement with one’s neighbours, systems of law and justice that go beyond the family, 
civilized forms of hospitality, and regard for the rights of outsiders. But the importance of 
the community and its institutions in the Odyssean view is apparent also in the camp of 
the Achaians in the Iliad. Like a peace-time city-state, the army holds assemblies to deal 
with all important issues, and it is in one of these that the dispute erupts between 
Agamemnon and Achilles over ‘prizes’ (gera) given in recognition of their prowess in 
battle and prestige within the community. The development of the quarrel, from the issue 
of prizes to that of the antagonists’ respective claims to leadership, indicates that Homeric 
values are not simple: though Achilles and Agamemnon are both ‘good’ (indeed each 
claims to be ‘best of the Achaians’), they are so for different reasons, and their 
‘goodness’ cannot be rated on a single scale of value. Neither’s claim is endorsed over 
the other’s, and when Nestor intervenes in the quarrel he acknowledges both: 
 ‘You, great man that you are, yet do not take the girl away 
 but let her be, a prize as the sons of the Achaians gave her 
 first. Nor, son of Peleus, think to match your strength with 
   the king, since never equal with the rest is the portion of honour 
  of the sceptred king to whom Zeus gives magnificence. Even 
 though you are the stronger man, and the mother who bore you was immortal, 
 yet is this man greater who is lord over more than you rule. 
   Son of Atreus, give up your anger; even I entreat you 
   to give over your bitterness against Achilleus, he who 
stands as a great bulwark of battle over all the Achaians.’ 
Some people think that Nestor’s request that Agamemnon should not take 
Achilles’ prize, ‘great man (agathos) that he is’, demonstrates that Agamemnon has a 
claim to take the girl, though Nestor would prefer if he didn’t. But what Nestor is saying 
is that there are limits to the claims of the great and good. In fact Agamemnon himself 
had already, at a slightly earlier stage of the quarrel, used Nestor’s very phrase, ‘great 
man (agathos) that you are’, to express his view of the limits of Achilles’ claims. But in 
any case, ethical argument is not just a matter of deploying a limited range of words with 
different degrees of power. Agamemnon’s offence in Iliad 1 is indicated by his disregard 
of the assembly’s universal view that he should accept Chryses’ ransom for the return of 
his daughter, his failure to recognize that dishonouring a priest of Apollo is also to 
dishonour the god, and his threat simply to seize Achilles’ prize without regard for the 
normal protocols for distributing such prizes. In the presentation of this behaviour, the 
important terms are those which emphasize that the distribution of prizes is carried out in 
the name of the army as a whole, that in proposing to seize Briseis Agamemnon is acting 
entirely off his own bat. Achilles’ observation that ‘the sons of the Achaians’ gave him 
Briseis uses no especially ‘moral’ vocabulary, but it is still a moral argument: a 
distribution made in the name of the collective should not be unmade at the whim of the 
king. Agamemnon’s disregard of protocol is summed up the repeated use of the simple 
word autos (self) in phrases such as ‘I’ll go and take her myself’ or ‘he took my prize 
himself’. These emphasize the illegitimacy of ‘just taking for yourself’ in a society in 
which reciprocity is the norm. It’s just that, at this stage, Agamemnon doesn’t care about 
ethics or protocol, but wants to demonstrate his power so that no one will stand up 
against him again: 
    ‘I shall take the fair-cheeked Briseis, 
 your prize, I myself going to your shelter, that you may learn well 
 how much greater I am than you, and another man may shrink  
 back from likening himself to me and contending against me.’ 
The tone is different in Book 2, though the judgement is the same, when Agamemnon 
ruefully admits that he ‘started it’; this is the notion that Odysseus refers to in Book 19 
when, as the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon is finally resolved, he observes 
that the whole thing was the result of the unjust behaviour of the man who ‘started it’. 
This judgement is wholly in tune with the way that the quarrel is presented in Book 1. 
 The notion of reciprocity that means that ‘starting it’ is wrong also means that 
retaliation is normally legitimate. Thus the expedition against Troy is presented as 
legitimate retaliation for the offence of Paris, and there is understanding for the retaliation 
of Achilles, at least until he refuses what everyone else regards as an appropriate 
settlement in Book 9. The Iliad, in fact, has more to say about the non-violent settlement 
of disputes than the apparently more peaceful and moralistic Odyssey: the settlement of a 
homicide case is a highlight of the ‘city at peace’ depicted on the Shield of Achilles in 
Book 18; Ajax refers to a similar mechanism in condemning Achilles’ refusal to settle in 
Book 9; Diomedes’ silence in the face of an insult from Agamemnon in Book 4 contrasts 
with Achilles’ response in Book 1; and disputes during the Funeral Games of Patroclus 
are settled without violence or loss of face in Book 23. Achilles miscalculates (in Books 1 
and 9) when he thinks that he wants the suffering of his comrades to bring about 
Agamemnon’s humiliation; the suffering of his comrades, in the person of his best friend, 
Patroclus, turns out to be something he wishes he’d never asked for; and in the end he 
settles in Book 19 for a face-saving performance in which Agamemnon is permitted to 
disclaim responsibility for the quarrel and he himself accepts this, even indulging in some 
face-saving of his own (just as Agamemnon was overcome by the irresistible force of 
Delusion when he insulted Achilles, so Achilles, he says, would not have become so 
angry had it not somehow been the will of Zeus that large numbers of his comrades 
should be killed). Despite the Iliad’s violence, and despite the competitive and 
individualist aspects of its ethics, settlement of disputes without violence and with 
concern for the face of both parties is an ideal espoused by the characters and apparently 
vindicated by the thrust of the narrative. If only Achilles had seen this in Book 9. 
 At the same time, society’s ability to restrain the powerful is limited, and people’s 
defence of their rights in the face of others’ attacks frequently depends on physical force 
or powerful connexions. Resolution of disputes by third parties depends on the status and 
attitudes of the disputants and the authority of the arbitrator. Odysseus can roundly 
admonish Agamemnon for his injustice once the quarrel has been resolved, but in Book 1 
he says nothing, and Nestor is, by necessity, less forthright in his language. Achilles 
poses as the defender of the army against the arbitrary exploitation of a ‘people-
devouring’ king in Book 1; he is therefore disappointed when the assembly keeps its 
counsel rather than taking his side, to the extent that he implicates the entire force in his 
retaliation, and it is only when the effects of that retaliation begin to bite that moves are 
made to appease him. Achilles himself can intervene in Book 23 to remind others that 
quarrelling is unseemly, but his authority as master of ceremonies is greater in that 
context than even that of Nestor in his own quarrel with Agamemnon. Homeric values 
and social institutions work when all act as is expected of them; but no society is perfect, 
and when rules are broken, the response very much depends on the circumstances and on 
the character, status, and connexions of the individuals concerned. 
